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The Fuller Court and State Criminal Process:
Threshold of Modern Limitations on Government
William F. Duker*
The Fuller Court is notorious for its judicial activism. Mere
citation of Lochner v. New Yorkl by judicial conservatives2 is
sufficient to embarrass defenders of Warren Court activi~m.~
Elsewhere I have examined the Fuller Court's "liberty of contract" cases and have argued that the decisions in those caseswere dictated by a master idea of individual liberty which, in the
Court's view, superseded paternalistic legislation designed to
remedy the social problems of the corporate revolution.' Social
legislation that discriminated among classes was pregumptively
void. However, this position was sharply contrasted by the position taken in criminal cases coming from the state courts. In this
latter area, the Fuller Court's posture was a model of selfrestraint.
One way to relax the tension between the two sets of cases
is to suggest that the Court was representing the interests of the
elite: legislation attempting to ameliorate the unequal bargaining power between employer and employee was commonly
struck down; legislation providing swift justice for the criminal
defendant was upheld. It thus could be argued that the Court
was motivated simply by a desire to protect private property.
Such a conclusion, however, fails to take account of the Court's
vigorous enforcement of the antitrust laws. The better conclusion is based on the Court's perception of historically proper legislative activity. The "liberty of contract" decisions were a re* B.A., 1976, State Univ. of New York at Albany; Ph.D, 1978, University of
Cambridge.
1. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
2. Ely, Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV.L. REV. 5, 15
(1978).
3. See generally Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV.L. REV.1 (1979).
See also Tushnet, The Newer Property: Suggestions for the Revival of Substantive Due
Process, 1975 S. CT. REV.261, 277 (1976).
4. Duker, Mr. Justice Rufus W.Peckham: The Police Power and the Individual in
a Changing World, 1980 B.Y.U. L. REV.47.
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sponse to a new brand of legislation, one attempting a degree of
marketplace regulation never before undertaken. Although the
Court was willing to allow government to check the growth of
artificial monopolies, which, like big government, threatened individual liberty, it otherwise refused to allow government restrictions upon individual liberty of contract. On the other hand,
the legislative role in the criminal justice system was well established, and as long as state criminal process was applied equally,
the Supreme Court refused to allow federal court intervention.
I t is true that this application of federalism and equal treatment, like the application of all "neutral" principles, was not
truly neutral, but this should not cast a shadow on the motives
of the Court. Its conception of the judicial role, like that of the
Warren and Burger Courts, was merely a reflection of its understanding of contemporary constitutional and normative values.
Because it is the value system of another day that reaches
back to examine Lochner and the Fuller Court decisions in racerelated and criminal law cases, it may be felt that the presentday debate over the rightful place of courts is not helped by invoking the Fuller legacy. However, the Fuller Court era occupied
a critical moment in American constitutional history-a moment
at the threshold of modern constitutional government-and understanding how that Court ensured limited government is essential to understanding the origin of modern limitations on
government and the normative values that those limitations
reflect.
State criminal cases have been selected for study because
they lie at the interface of federalism and process-the former
providing the primary means of ensuring individual liberty for
those who framed the Constitution; the latter providing the primary means of ensuring individual liberty today. This Article
begins by exploring the foundations of Fuller Court federalism
and process. It turns next to selected clusters of state criminal
cases involving claims of systematic exclusion, cruel and unusual
punishment, and self-in~rimination.~
5. Other types of claims considered by the Fuller Court will not be given textual
treatment for various reasons. Although the Court did decide cases dealing with double
jeopardy, see Brantley v. Georgia, 217 U.S. 284 (1910); Keerl v. Montana, 213 U.S. 135
(1909); Bassing v. Cady, 208 U.S. 386 (1908); Schoener v. Pennsylvania, 207 U.S. 188
(1907); Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71 (1902); New York v. Eno, 155 U.S. 89 (1894), and
with violations of guarantees against unlawful seizure, see Consolidated Rendering Co. v.
Vermont, 207 U.S.541 (1908); Adam v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904);Miller v. Texas,
153 U.S. 535 (1894), it managed to avoid direct confrontation with the question of the
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The Founding Fathers envisioned state courts as the primary protectors of individual liberty and the primary agencies of
criminal justice.. The habeas corpus clause of the Constitution,
for instance, was intended to restrict Congress from suspending
state habeas corpus for federal prisoners, and the first habeas
statute specifically denied federal habeas corpus jurisdiction in
state cases.' Federal entry into the affairs of state criminal process was narrow. The Bill of Rights, as Chief Justice Marshall
observed in Barron v. Baltimore,. was meant to restrict the activities of only the federal government. The Marshall Court did
much to ensure the supremacy of the federal courts where their
power was challenged: but it was not until the chief justiceship
of Roger B. Taneylo that the supremacy of the federal judiciary
was dramatically displayed. The national protection that the
"peculiar instituTaney Court lent to slavery-the
tiod9-completed the transformation of the habeas corpus
clause of the Constitution. From that time forth, the clause
would be interpreted to guarantee federal habeas corpus and the
state courts would be denied power to issue writs of habeas
applicability of those federal constitutional provisions to the states. Both types of cases
do provide additional illustration of the Court's unwillingness to interfere with state
criminal process, but add little to that found in the examples to be examined. Similarly,
cases challenging a state's failure to allow a defendant to confront witnesses, see West v.
Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258 (1904); Murray v. Louisiana, 163 U.S. 101 (1896), and failure to
grant a defendant a right of appeal, see Rogers v. Peck, 199 U.S. 425 (1905); Allen v.
Georgia, 166 US. 138 (1897); Kohl v. Lehlback, 160 U.S. 293 (1895); McKane v. Durston,
153 U.S. 684 (1894); Hallinger v. Davis, 146 U.S. 314 (1892); Fielden v. Illinois, 143 U.S.
452 (1892); Schwab v. Berggren, 143 U.S. 442 (1892), contain language expressing the
Court's unwillingness to intervene in state criminal process, but again add little to language used in the cases to be treated.
During the Fuller era, the Court also refused to interfere with state contempt proceedings irrespective of the individual right asserted, see Consolidated Rendering Co. v.
Vermont, 207 U.S. 541 (1908) (self-incrimination); Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454
(1907) (freedom of press); Eilenbecker v. District Court of Plymouth Co., 134 U.S. 31
(1890) (trial by jury), but since courts traditionally have been reluctant to interfere with
the efforts of another court to vindicate its dignity and authority, federalism and process
explanations for the decisions may be suspect.
6. See Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Hmv. L. REV. 1362, 1401 (1953).
7. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 5 14, 1 Stat. 73.
8. 32 U.S. (7 Pet) 243, 250 (1833).
9. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
10. Justice Taney was, ironically, an ardent supporter of states' rights.
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corpus for federal prisoners.ll
The Civil War had a tremendous symbolic effect on the federal structure, but that war did not divide states' rightists from
non-states' rightists. Rather, it separated those who espoused
dual federalism or states' rights from those who espoused absolute state sovereignty." While wartime measures previewed
modern nationalism,lS commitment to states' rights remained
strong. The fourteenth amendment, which has had such a
profound effect on modern constitutional adjudication, had little
impact during the years immediately following its incorporation.
In the Slaughter-House Cases," the Court practically read the
"privileges and immunities" clause out of the amendment by
holding that the only privileges and immunities secured equally
to all were those that arose out of the nature and essential character of the national government. Justice Miller's reading in
that case was influenced by his refusal to believe that the purpose of the fourteenth amendment was to transfer the protection
of all civil rights from the states to the federal government. If
this were so, "Congress . . [could] also pass laws . . . limiting
and restricting the exercise of legislative power by the States, in
their moat ordinary and usual functions," and the Supreme
Court would be "a perpetual censor upon all legislation of the
States, on the civil rights of their own citizens, with authority to
nullify such as it did not approve as consistent with those
rights."16
The first substantial test for the "due process" clause of the
fourteenth amendment came in Hurtado v. California.16 As permitted by the California constitution, Hurtado had been brought
to trial for murder on an information after examination and
commitment by a magistrate. On writ of error to the state supreme court, which had aflirmed his conviction, Hurtado requested the United States Supreme Court to overturn the state
court decision because he had not been indicted by a grand jkuy.
After examination of English legal history, the Court found that
indictment by a grand jury was not part of the settled usages

.

11. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858).
12. Benedict, Preserving Federalism: Reconstruction and the Waite Court, 1978 S.
CT.REV.39, 45.
13. Benedict, Contagion and the Constitution: Quarantine Agitation from 1859 to
1866, 25 J. HIST.MED. AND ALLIED SCI.177 (1970).
14. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.)36 (1872).
15. Id. at 78.
16. 110 US.516 (1884).

.
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and modes of proceeding of English common law. Even if it
were, reasoned the Court, it would be unwise for states to be
bound by any fixed set of criminal procedure. In addition, it observed that the fifth amendment, which secured due process at
the federal level, provided separately for indictment by a grand
jury. Since "due process" meant the same thing in both the fifth
and the fourteenth amendments, and since no part of the Constitution was superfluous, the Court concluded that due process
did not of itself require indictment by a grand jury.
The concept of equality before the law thus took on more
than just the meaning of the equal protection clause:17 it included the interpretation of privileges and immunities after
Slaughter-House and the idea of due process after Hurtado.
Against this background, substantive due process was a natural
development. The Fuller Court took one step back from the
clauses of the fourteenth amendment and required that legislatures assume a neutral position in the enactment of legislation.
The concept of federalism restraining the fourteenth
amendment was afErmed shortly after Hurtado. In 1868 the Supreme Court's power under the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 had
been revoked by the Radical Republican Congress because of an
unreasonable fear that the Court was about to declare the Reconstruction program unconstitutional.18 The significance of this
1868 revocation with respect to state criminal cases was that the
lower federal courts were left to interpret the Habeas Corpus
Act of 1867 without the guidance of the Supreme Court, and
these courts were not reluctant to use their power to the fullest
extent. For example, in the early 1880's, in a number of cases
involving discrimination by Pacific coast states and municipalities against immigrant Chinese, the federal courts released
habeas corpus applicants prior to trial or immediately following
convictions on the ground that the state statute or ordinance
was unconstitutional. The courts were no less hesitant to overturn decisions of states' highest courts. This ready interference
with state judicial systems was not well received by the legal
community, and congressional action was requested. The request
was answered in 1885 in the form of a rescission of the 1868
17. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
AND RECONSTRUCTION
POLITICS
(1968).
18. See generally S. KUTLER,JUDICIALPOWER
Ex parte McCardle, 74 US. (7 Wall.)506 (1868), was pending before the Court at the
time.
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measure; the Supreme Court's jurisdiction was restored,'@ although accompanied by a mandate that federal interference in
state criminal proceedings be limited.20The Supreme Court had
no difficulty understanding the congressional intent and almost
immediately responded with the exhaustion doctrine in Ex parte
R~yall.~
Under
l
that doctrine federal habeas corpus jurisdiction
was to be guided by a principle of comity and, except in "special
circumstances," not to be invoked until state remedies were
exhausted.
Federalism is an instrumental concept. In the formative era
of the Republic, federalism was deemed necessary to safeguard
individual liberty. Suspicion of centralized government survived
the transformation from confederation to federal union, and was
evidenced, as noted above, in the habeas corpus clause. To effectuate the Compromise of 1850 and the Fugitive Slave Act there
was an upsurge of national power before the Civil War. The nationalism of the Civil War itself was designed to save and not to
destroy the federal structure. The Supreme Court's jurisdiction
under the 1867 Act was revoked by Congress only to secure its
Reconstruction program. The 1885 measure evidenced in turn a
recognition that Reconstruction was long over and that the leftover legislation was producing undesirable effects. Federal interference with state criminal process was unwelcome; the availability of such interference as a means for frustrating swift justice
was inconsistent with general attitudes toward criminal
law-attitudes that stressed crime repression, not due process.22
Although vigilantism had enjoyed a long history in America?
the late nineteenth century witnessed a notable surge in this
form of extra-legal violence. These energetic acts of "public
spirit" naturally had a feedback effect on the criminal justice
system. The legal community in fact reacted by attempting "to
bring the regular system of law and order closer to the spirit and
Even while lawmakers sought to dispractice of ~igilantisrn."~~
19. Act of March 3, 1885, ch. 353, 23 Stat. 437.
20. H.R. REP.NO. 730, 48th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1884).
21. 117 U.S. 241 (1886).
22. Brown, Legal and Behavioral Perspectives on American Vigilantism, in LAWm
AMERICAN
HISTORY
95 (D. Fleming & B. Bailyn eds. 1971).
23. Brown, Historical Patterns of Violence in America, in 1 VIOLENCE
IN AMERICA:
AND COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVES
35 (H. Graham & T. Gurr eds. 1969); Brown,
HISTORICAL
The American Vigilante Tradition, in 1 VIOLENCE
IN AMERICA:
HISTORICAL
AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES
121 (H. Graham & T. Gurr eds., 1969).
24. Brown, supra note 22, at 106.
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suade local officials from cooperating with lynchers by drafting
statutes that imposed fines and created means of removing offending officials from office, legal scholars, such as Charles J. Bonaparte, argued that the remedy for lynching lay in making the
criminal law more effective and realistic. Bonaparte distinguished "lynch law" from "mere disorder": the former was
meant "not to violate, but to vindicate, the law; or, to speak
more accurately, the law is violated in form that it may be vindicated in substance, its 'adjective' part (i.e., matter of procedure)
is disregarded that its 'substantive' part may be preserved?' To
effectuate his goal, Bonaparte suggested that the number of capital crimes be increased, that grand juries be abolished, that the
right of preemptory challenge be eliminated, that the double
jeopardy guarantee be abrogated, that trials be accelerated, and
that the executive be stripped of power to pardon." Others endorsed parts of his remedy.27Some, such as Supreme Court Justice David J. Brewer, suggested that the right of appeal be aboli ~ h e d Simeon
. ~ ~ Baldwin advocated whipping and castration as
punishments for crime.2@This general attitude was reflected in
many state criminal statutes and the congressional decision to
revoke the 1868 measure. The judicial response to the congressional revocation decision acknowledged the legitimacy of such
statutes.
The neutral principles that directed the decisions of the
Fuller Court in state criminal cases thus had been formulated
before the Court took its place in history, and the focus now
shifts to that Court's application of those principles. Cases challenging the composition of state grand and petit juries were determined not by racist predispositions of the individual judges,
but by established concepts of federalism and equality-concepts which also determined the disposition of cruel and
unusual punishment and self-incrimination challenges.
25. Bonaparte, Lynch Law and Its Remedy, 8

YALEL.J. 335, 336 (1899).

26. Id. at 342.
27. See generally Brown, supra note 22.
28. Brewer, The Right of Appeal, 55 INDEPENDENT
2547 (1903).

29. Baldwin, Whipping and Castration As Punishments for Crime, 8 YALE
L.J. 371
(1899); Baldwin, The Restoration of Whipping as a Punishment For Crime, 13 GREEN
BAG65 (1901).
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In an otherwise brilliant article, Michael Les Benedict argued that the modern criticism of the Supreme Court under
Chief Justice Morrison Waite has failed "to distinguish the position of the Waite Court from its successors, accepting, for instance, the reactionary decisions of the Fuller Court in civil
rights cases as logical extensions of the Waite Court doctrines,
which they were not.'"O In all fairness, Professor Benedict was
examining only the.Waite Court's posture toward federalism and
not the decisions of the Fuller Court. Had those decisions been
examined, Professor Benedict would have found that they were
indeed logical extensions of the Waite Court doctrines. The
master ideas applied by the Fuller Court in civil rights cases followed directly from Slaughter-House and Hurtado. But, Professor Benedict might ask, if substantive due process grew naturally from the equality principle at work in Slaughter-House
and Hurtado-a principle that rejected government interference
with the liberty of the individual and condemned legislation that
discriminated among classes-how could the Fuller Court uphold "Jim Crow" legislation that provided for separate coaches
for black and white railway passengers? The answer is that the
relationship between liberty and equality is a complicated one.
It is apparent to a people schooled in a class presided over by
the Warren Court that equal treatment for all often means liberty for only some. However, the individual liberty secured by
substantive due process during the Fuller Court era was not
equality of outcome, but equality of treatment before the law
and equality of opportunity, both of which were thought to be
attainable if legislation favored no particular class and artificial
monopolies were a b ~ l i s h e d .The
~ ~ majority in Plessy u. Ferguson? for example, asserted that a "statute which implies merely
a legal distinction . . has no tendency to destroy the legal
equality of the two races."ss The statute involved was thus
viewed as effecting merely a legal distinction, rather than as a
breach of equality before the lawY The judicial activism of the

.

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Benedict, supra note 12, at 40.
Duker,supra note 4.
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
Id. at 543.
Id. at 551.
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Fuller Court was designed to keep government in check, and the
petitioner in Plessy was requesting the Court to go not only
where government ought not, but where it could not go. Although the statute in question was enacted only six years earlier,
it was viewed as affirming the natural order, and judicial intervention was viewed as unwelcome governmental interference. In
the Court's view, government was simply powerless to eradicate
racial prejudice.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to examine the Plessy
line of cases. It suffices to say that they rested comfortably on
the foundation laid by the Waite Court. However, another series
of race-related cases-involving the charge of systematic exclusion of blacks from grand and petit juries-is directly relevant.
Like Plessy, the decisions in these cases were not guided by racial prejudice but by the "neutral principles" of federalism and
equality arising from an interaction of social forces-forces that
undoubtedly, but only incidentally, included racist elements.
The general rule adopted by the Court was one of refusing to
allow state prisoners alleging systematic exclusion to bypass the
normal state appellate process via federal habeas corpus or
removal.
I n re Wood,S5for example, brought to the Supreme Court
an appeal of a denial of a writ of habeas corpus by the United
States Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York. The
appellant contended that he had been indicted and convicted in
the state court by juries from which blacks had been specifically
excluded because of their race. Because he was without counsel
and even means of procuring counsel, the appellant had pleaded
guilty to the indictment and had failed at trial to challenge the
exclusion of blacks from the jury. Motion for a new trial and
petition for a writ of certiorari to the state appellate court were
unsuccessful.
Justice Harlan, for the Court, affirmed the denial, finding
that "such exclusion was not required by the laws" of the
state." As to whether blacks were excluded de facto was a question that the trial court was competent to decide, and its determination could not be revised by the United States Circuit
Court without making habeas corpus serve the purpose of a writ
of error. The question on habeas corpus was limited to whether
35. 140 U.S. 278 (1891).
36. Id. at 283 (emphasis added).

284

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[I980

the trial court had jurisdiction of the matter and of the person.
Therefore, even if the challenge had been made during trial and
erroneously determined, "such error in decision would not have
made the judgment of conviction void, or his detention under it
illegal."s7 The proper remedy, observed Harlan, would be to seek
out a writ of error to the highest court of the state having jurisdiction of the matter. The issuance of a writ of error, a nondiscretionary writ, far from being seen as an intrusion into the
state's process of law:8 was actually considered part of the
state's appellate structure. Unlike proceeding by habeas corpus,
the procedure outlined by Harlan avoided the possibility of a
decision of the highest court of a state being overturned by the
lowliest federal tribunal-an irritant that played a major role in
the decision to return the Supreme Court's jurisdiction under
the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867.s9
In Andrews v. swart^,^^ Justice Harlan again wrote for the
Court and again affirmed the denial of habeas corpus to a black
applicant challenging the exclusion of members of his race from
grand and petit juries. In this case, however, the appellant had
called the trial court's attention to the discriminatory manner of
jury selection and had moved that the court take testimony to
prove his allegation, but the court denied his motion and refused
to hear testimony. The appellant noted in his habeas corpus petition that an appeal to the state appellate court, as suggested in
Wood, would be useless because under state law writs of error in

-%

37. Id. at 287. In anticipation of the Court's decision, the appellant had argued that
under state statute and common law he was not permitted to challenge the composition
of a jury; therefore, the trial court had no jurisdiction. Harlan conceded that the state
code of criminal procedure did not permit the defendant to challenge the composition of
a grand jury, but he would not exclude the possibility that the state court might allow a
seasonably made challenge when the defect deprived the tribunal of the character of a
grand jury in a constitutional sense. Id. at 288.
38. See In re Frederich, 149 U.S. 70 (1893).
39. Justice Harlan's opinion was joined by all the Justices but Gray, who was not
present at the argument and who took no part in the decision, and Field, who filed a
separate concurring opinion. As he had done in Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 405-09
(1880), Field denied that there was anything in the Civil War Amendments that required
that blacks be summoned on grand or petit juries in order to secure persons of their race
justice and equality in the administration of the law. Even if the issue had been more
correctly framed in terms of whether the constitutional amendment allowed blacks to be
excluded even de facto from the possibility of serving as jurors solely because of their
race, Field apparently would have remained unmoved. As he saw it, the manner of jury
selection was entirely a matter of state regulation. See In re Wood, 140 U.S. at 370-71
(Field, J., concurring).
40. 156 U.S. 272 (1895).
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capital cases were writs of grace rather than writs of right. In
response to the first contention, Justice Harlan once more observed that the only issue cognizable on habeas was jurisdiction.
As to the second contention, he noted the rule of McKane v.
D ~ r s t o n , ~which
l
held that appellate review was not a sine qua
non of due process. Even if the writ of error were denied by the
state appellate court-a possibility which Harlan would not anticipate-the proper remedy was still to carry the case to the
highest court of the state having jurisdiction, thence to the Supreme Court on writ or error.
Removal proved no more successful in such cases than
habeas corpus. In Gibson v. Mississippi," the plaintiff in error, a
black charged with the murder of a white, sought removal to the
federal circuit court on the grounds that the subordinate officers
charged with gathering juries excluded blacks solely because of
their race and that the laws regulating jury selection were in this
case ex post facto. Though his contention indicated de facto
rather than de jure discrimination, Gibson attempted to avoid
the holding of In re Wood that such a problem was within the
competency of the state courts by arguing that the very distinction between de facto and de jure discrimination violated the
spirit of the fourteenth amendment:
Such a State through its people in its organic law, or Legislature, may enact the finest kind of laws, and spread them upon
its constitution or statutes, merely to avoid Federal interference; and yet permit its officers (who are of the white race, the
dominant race) to try white persons touching their life, liberty
and property, strictly in accordance with the laws of the State,
and try negroes touching their same interests contrary to the
laws; thus accomplishing in an indirect manner the very deprivation which the people of the United States sought to prohibit
by the enactment of the Fourteenth An~endment.'~

But Justice Harlan would not predict the ultimate actions of the
state courts. Through his opinion the Court held that the removal statutes did not embrace those cases where a right was
denied by judicial action or, as in this case, by actions of
subordinate officers of the trial court charged with gathering a
jury. The Court considered removal an appropriate remedy only
41. 153 U.S. 684 (1894).
42. 162 U.S. 565 (1896).
43. Id. at 575.
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where the state constitution or laws deprived one of some fundamental right guaranteed other citizens of the state. Relief in
other instances was available on appeal?*
In Murray v. L ~ u i s i a n athe
, ~ ~Supreme Court, in an opinion
by Justice Shiras, upheld a state supreme court's affirmance of a
trial court's disregard of a petition by the accused to have the
case removed to federal circuit court upon an allegation that
blacks were excluded from serving on grand or petit juries. The
Court simply cited Gibson and noted that the removal request
complained of acts of the jury commissioners rather than discrimination in state law. Argument that it was the law regulating
jury selection that violated the fourteenth amendment, because
it conferred upon jury commissioners judicial power by allowing
them to select jurors, was also rejected. The Court observed that
the accused was subject to treatment no different than that
given others, including white citizens; therefore, no federal question was presented.
The procedure that the Court had been defining as the
proper remedy was finally followed in Carter v. Texas.46There
the Court reversed and remanded the case of a black who had
challenged the exclusion of members of his race from the grand
jury. When the case was called for trial, the defendant Carter, in
open court and before arraignment and pleading to the indictment, unsuccessfully moved to quash the indictment. The trial
proceeded and Carter was found guilty. Carter then tendered a
bill of exceptions asking leave to introduce evidence to prove the
allegation, but the trial court refused to hear any evidence. The
state appellate court affirmed the trial court's refusal to quash
the indictment because the challenge to the composition of the
44. It was not clear to Justice Harlan that the record actually presented an ex post
facto question. Nevertheless, because human life was involved, because the defendant
had pleaded not guilty, and because the state attorney general had discussed the question without disputing the Supreme Court's authority to pass on it, the Court decided to
examine the allegation. It noted that the only difference between the applied Code of
1892, which took effect after the date of the charged murder, and the Code of 1880, in
force a t the time of the alleged murder, was the requirement that persons selected for
jury service should possess good intelligence, sound judgment, and fair character. This
difference, observed Justice Harlan, did not affect "in any degree the substantial rights
of those who had committed crime prior to its going into effect." Id. at 589. It did not
make criminal any act innocent when committed, provide for greater punishment than
the law in force during the commission of the crime, or alter the rules of evidence.
Rather, the change "related simply to procedure." Id. at 590.
45. 163 U.S. 101 (1896).
46. 177 U.S. 442 (1900).
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grand jury, made after the indictment was found, had come too
late. The state appellate court in fact later abandoned that rationale and instead observed that the contention was merely a
tender of the issue without evidence in support. The case then
went to the United States Supreme Court on writ of error.
For the Court, Justice Gray observed that Carter was never
given an opportunity to challenge the grand jury that found the
indictment against him. He noted that the grand jury had been
impaneled prior to the time of the offense for which the defendant had been indicted, and that the defendant thus had been
denied the equal treatment of the laws:
Whenever by any action of a State, whether through its legislature, through its courts, or through its executive or administrative officers, all persons of the African race are excluded, solely
because of their race or color, from serving as grand jurors in
the criminal prosecution of a person of the African race, the
equal protection of the laws is denied to him, contrary to the
Fourteenth Amendment . . . .47

Unlike the earlier cases, Carter involved only minimal interference with state criminal process. It also satisfied the Courtestablished rule that if the Supreme Court directly interfered
with state process, it would do so only after regular state channels had been exhausted.48

In an era when lynchings outpaced legal executions and
when those interested in reversing that trend were suggesting an
increase in the number of crimes labeled capital, the Court never
entertained the challenge that capital punishment per se was
47. Id. at 447.
48. Where race was not a factor in challenges to jury composition, the Court likewise
refused to interfere. The exclusion of a juror because he was not a freeholder, Leeper v.
Texas, 139 U.S. 462 (1891), or because he had formed an opinion on the merits of the
case, Howard v. Kentucky, 200 US. 164 (1906), or the failure to exclude an alien, Kohl v.
Lehlback, 160 U.S. 293 (1895), did not deprive one of due process, since treatment before
the law was not unequal, and so did not present questions that the state courts could not
conclusively decide. Additionally, selection of a jury according to statutory provisions for
a struck jury was held not to be a deprivation of fundamental rights. Brown v. New
Jersey, 175 U.S.172 (1899). Finally, in Rawlins v. Georgia, 201 U.S.638 (1906),the Court
rejected a request to overturn the conviction of an individual who had been indicted by a
grand jury constituted under rules excluding certain professional groups. Justice Holmes
observed that the exclusion was not based upon race and was a common practice, i.e.
equal treatment had been afforded.
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cruel and unusual. However cruel, capital punishment was certainly not unusual. But the era did witness the invention and
employment of a novel means of execution, the electric chair,
which as a statutorily authorized tool was challenged as cruel
and unusual in In re Kemrnler.'. The New York State Legislature enacted the capital punishment statute at issue in Kemmler
in 1888-to take effect the next year-in response to the 1885
annual message of the governor asking the legislature to replace
death by hanging with a "less barbarous manner" of execution.
However unusual, electrocution was viewed as less cruel by the
democratic branches.
Kemmler came to the Supreme Court after state appellate
and collateral remedies had been exhausted. It was aruged that
the state statute violated the due process and privileges and immunities clauses of the fourteenth amendment. The Court rejected the argument, noting that the fourteenth amendment had
not been designed to radically alter the relationship between the
federal and state governments and that the states, not the federal government, were the primary protectors of life, liberty, and
property.
[Tlhe amendment forbids any arbitrary deprivation of life, liberty, or property, and secures equal protection to all under like
circumstances in the enjoyment of their rights; and, in the administration of criminal justice, requires that no different or
higher punishment shall be imposed upon one than is imposed
upon all for like offences. But it was not designed to interfere
with the power of the State to protect the lives, liberties and
property of its citizens, and to promote their health, peace,
morals, education and good orderP

The Court could have relied solely on this understanding of federalism and thereby avoided defining "cruel and unusual," but it
did not. It stated in dicta that punishments were cruel only
when they involved torture or lingering death, and that capital
punishment itself was not cruelF Shortly afterwards, Kemmler
became the first person to be executed by electrocution.
Earlier that year, the Court in in re Medley62had examined
a capital punishment statute and determined that its solitary
49. 136 U.S. 436 (law).
50. Id. at 448-49 (footnote omitted).
51. Id. at 447.
52. 134 U.S. 160 (1890).
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confinement provision made it ex post facto because it imposed
an additional punishment. Although in striking down the statute
the Court relied exclusively on this identified ex post facto feature, Justice Miller took the occasion to trace the history of solitary confinement in an examination which revealed its inhumanity. He concluded his survey by noting the preamble of 25
George 2, c. 37, which termed solitary confinement "a further
terror and peculiar mark of infamy," and 6 & 7 William 4, c. 30,
which abolished solitary confinement in England in response to
a revolt of public opinion. A challenge similar to that raised in
Medley was made in Holden v. Minne~ota,"~
but in that case the
solitary confinement aspect of the state's capital punishment
statute, enacted after the crime charged was committed, was
found not to have been imposed." It was only in McElvaine v.
Brushs6that the issue of the constitutionality of solitary confinement came directly before the Court. With Justice Miller no
longer on the Bench, the Court, speaking through Chief Justice
Fuller, held that neither the eighth nor the fourteenth amendments prohibited the punishment under examination. The
eighth amendment was held to operate exclusively on the federal
government. The fourteenth amendment question was considered settled by Kemmler and Holden-which, of course, it was
not.
The Fuller Court never again addressed the issue of the
constitutionality of solitary confinement. The confinements challenged in Rooney v. North DakotaWand Rogers v. Pecks7 were
found to be "closed," rather than solitary, confinements, which
the Court viewed as identical to simple confinement or custody,
i.e., "only such custody, as will safely secure the production . .
of the prisoner on the day appointed for his exec~tion."~~
The
cases thus involved no fundamental right warranting federal interference with a state in the administration of its domestic
affairs.
The only possible challenge remaining under the constitutional standard articulated by the Court was that the punishment imposed in an individual case was more severe than that

.

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

137 U.S.
See also
142 U.S.
196 U.S.
199 U.S.
196 U.S.

483 (law).

Rooney v. North Dakota, 196 U.S. 319 (1905).
155 (1891).
319 (1905).
425 (1905).
at 325.
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normally imposed-a challenge raised specifically in Howard v.
Fleming." That case involved the conviction of three persons for
conspiracy. One was sentenced to seven years imprisonment, the
others to ten years. The latter two contended that they were denied the equal protection of the laws because other offenses,
which most would consider more grievous, received a lesser punishment. The Court's most conservative and outspoken member
on criminal justice, Justice David Brewer, stated that "[ulndue
leniency in one case does not transform a reasonable punishment in another case to a cruel one."60 In fact, said Brewer, if
the sentence works to deter, the state ought to be congratulated
and not condemned."l
For the Fuller Court, the disposition of an individual convicted of an offense against the laws of a state was a matter left
to the state itself. The fourteenth amendment required equal
treatment in the disposition of state convicts, but it did not
make the eighth amendment applicable to state criminal cases.

IV. SELF-INCRIMINATION
The Fuller Court first heard a self-incrimination challenge
by a state prisoner in Adarns v. New York." By admitting certain illegally seized evidence, the trial court was charged with
having compelled the defendant to be a witness against himself.
The Supreme Court rejected the argument, observing that the
accused was not compelled to take the witness stand in his own
behalf, to testify concerning the illegally seized papers, or to
make any admissions about them. The observation was relevant
not because of any direct constitutional guarantee applied to the
states, but because the laws of the state itself guaranteed the
privilege against self-incrimination. Had it been found that Adams was compelled to testify in violation of that privilege, the
finding would have simply suggested a case of deprivation of
equal treatment under the applicable New York laws.
The challenge was next heard by the Court in Barrington u.
M i s s o ~ r i However,
.~~
because the constitutional challenge had
not been seasonably made, the Court refused to find that state59. 191 U.S. 126 (1903).
60. Id. at 136.
61. Id.
62. 192 US. 585 (1904).
63. 205 U.S. 483 (1907).
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ments made by the appellant while in the "sweatbox" of the St.
Louis police department compelled him to be a witness against
himself. Objection to the admission of the evidence had been
made during trial and had been based not upon constitutional
grounds but upon the grounds of irrelevancy, immateriality, and
failure to lay a proper foundation. The Court observed in passing that the fifth amendment operated only as a restriction on
federal power.
The question finally received full treatment in Twining v.
New Jersey." There, at the trial of a defendant charged with
knowingly falsifying trust company records with intent to
deceive examiners, the jury was instructed that it might draw
unfavorable inferences from the defendant's failure to testify
where it was within his power to respond to evidence that
tended to incriminate him. It was first argued that the privileges
and immunities clause guaranteed the exemption from self-incrimination as a fundamental right of national citizenship. The
Supreme Court, however, followed the Slaughter-Housea5holding and rejected this argument. The defendant then appealed to
the fourteenth amendment's due process clause, and the Court
gave the question extensive treatment. It set out three tests for
determining whether the requirements of due process were satisfied. The first test asked whether the exemption was a privilege
recognized by English common or statutory law before the settlement of the American colonies and shown to be suited to colonial life? The exemption failed this test. The second test questioned whether the exemption was a "fundamental principle of
liberty and justice which inheres in the very idea of free government."@' After cautioning his brethren not to import their own
personal views as to what was wise, just, or fitting into the Constitution, Justice Moody set out to answer the second test by
examining early American legal history. A survey of early state
constitutional provisions and suggested amendments to the Federal Constitution convinced Justice Moody that the exemption
"was not conceived to be inherent in due process of law, but on
the other hand a right separate, independent and outside of due
64. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
65. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.)36 (1872).

66. This is an American version of the doctrine of Calvin's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 377

(K.B.1607).
67. 211 U.S. at 106.
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pro~ess."~'The final test guaranteed process designed to check
arbitrary government. The Court concluded that since the defendant was given reasonable notice and an opportunity to be
heard, he had not been subjected to any arbitrary governmental
power.e9 The Court concluded that even under an assumption
that the defendant had been compelled to incriminate himself,
no federal question was presented because the fourteenth
amendment offered no protection from self-incrimination in
state criminal cases. That amendment did not effect an alteration in federal-state relations:
The power o f . . . [the] people [of the states] ought not to be
fettered, their sense of responsibility lessened, and their capacity for sober and restrained self-government weakened by
forced construction of the Federal Constitution. If the people
of New Jersey are not content with the law as declared in repeated decisions of their courts, the remedy is in their own
hands.70

Continuing the Jeffersonian tradition-a tradition enhanced
by the teachings of Herbert Spencer-the Fuller Court endeavored to protect individual liberty by working to ensure limited
government. National power was kept in check by a notion of
federalism that prohibited federal interference with state law
and process as long as each was equally applied. This concept of
federalism and equal treatment not only explains the Fuller
Court's passive posture toward state criminal cases, but also accounts for the Court's contrastingly vigorous and more famous
responses to state efforts to regulate the market place by paternalistic measures. In cases where the equality required by the
Fuller Court's understanding of the fourteenth amendment was
violated, the normal constraints of federalism were simply
dropped and national intervention justified and even required.
With the nexus between the Fuller Court's understanding of
federalism and its interpretation of equal treatment, it was natural that the eventual success of the progressives to undermine
substantive due process would also bring down the nineteenth
68. Id. at 110.
69. Id. at 111-12.
70. Id. at 114.
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century conception of legitimate federal-state relations. Such a
traditional notion of federalism would only frustrate the new
bulwarks of individual liberty-the process-oriented rights of
the Bill of Rights. To accommodate the spirit of limited government that prevailed in the age of substantive due process and
yet acknowledge the idea of social democracy that brought that
age to an end, the Supreme Court gradually began to expand
process-oriented rights. The expansion itself climaxed during
the Warren era. Where the judiciary was once passive, it became
active; where it was once active, it became passive. Substantive
due process was turned inside out.
The progressive program of this latter period sought to
solve the problems of the corporate revolution with increased
governmental intervention. Government itself grew with the corporate state. To protect individual liberty in the twentieth century required that the courts restructure large-scale organizations. The injunction became a tool of social reform used to
restructure school, police, and prison system^;^' habeas corpus
became an instrument to restructure the criminal justice systems. Once again, however, substantive due process, though in
its modern context, has come under attack. The Burger Court
has reacted by circumscribing process and denying substantive
claims. We appear to be at another threshold, but at this point it
is unclear what will provide tomorrow's bulwark of individual
liberty.

71. See generally 0.FISS,THE CIVILRIGHTSINJUNCTION
(1978).

